Fondement hylémorphique de la discontinuité métaphysique entre l’intelligence artificielle et la subjectivité humaine

Autores/as

  • Fernando Antonio Ramos-Zaga Universidad Privada del Norte, Lima, Perú

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.53439/stdfyt57.29.2026.43-71

Palabras clave:

ontologie, anthropologie philosophique, hylémorphisme, téléologie, éthique technologique, subsidiarité technique

Resumen

Cet article examine la spécificité ontologique de la personne humaine à l’aune du développement contemporain de l’intelligence artificielle. Le débat autour des systèmes artificiels, nourri par le dépassement du mécanisme classique et l’essor des modèles computationnels complexes, a déplacé la question de la cognition d’une approche strictement fonctionnelle vers une controverse plus large portant sur la subjectivité, la conscience et la normativité. L’étude soutient qu’une telle controverse ne peut être abordée de manière satisfaisante qu’à travers une articulation souple entre philosophie de l’esprit, phénoménologie et métaphysique classique. Dans cette perspective, la structure substantielle, opératoire et téléologique du sujet humain est mise en regard de l’organisation technique des systèmes artificiels. L’analyse montre que la compréhension sémantique, l’autodétermination morale, l’affectivité vécue et l’assomption de la finitude temporelle manifestent une intériorité spirituelle irréductible à la manipulation syntaxique et à l’obsolescence fonctionnelle. Dès lors, l’intelligence artificielle ne saurait être considérée comme un sujet moral ni comme une instance autonome de normativité. L’étude conclut que la gouvernance technologique doit être orientée par le principe de subsidiarité technique, en subordonnant la conception algorithmique au jugement moral humain.

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Citas

Agustine. (2001). Confessions (H. Chadwick, trad.). Oxford University Press.

Aristote. (1991). De Anima (R. D. Hicks, trad.; 25th illus. ed.). Prometheus Books.

Aristote. (2001). Physics. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (R. P. Hardie & R. K. Gaye, trads., Vol. 1, pp. 315–446). Princeton University Press.

Block, N. (1980). Troubles with Functionalism. In N. Block (Ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 268-305). Harvard University Press.

Block, N. (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90(1), 5-43. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184371

Boden, M. A. (1990). The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms. Basic Books.

Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press.

Brentano, F. (1995). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (L. L. McAlister, ed.; A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell & L. L. McAlister, trads.). Routledge (original publicado en 1874).

Capurro, R. (2008). On Floridi’s Metaphysical Foundation of Information Ecology. Ethics and Information Technology, 10(2-3), 167-173. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9162-x

Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.

Deacon, T. W. (2011). Incomplete Nature: How Mind emerged from Matter. W. W. Norton.

Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Company.

Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1992). What Computers still can’t do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. MIT Press.

Ellul, J. (1964). The Technological Society (J. Wilkinson, trad.). Vintage Books (original publicado en 1954).

Finnis, J. (1980). Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford University Press.

Floridi, L. (2013). The Ethics of Information. Oxford University Press.

Gehlen, A. (1950). Der Mensch: Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Aula-Verlag.

Guardini, R. (1950). The End of the Modern World. Henry Regnery Company.

Harnad, S. (1990). The Symbol Grounding Problem. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 42(1-3), 335-346. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2789(90)90087-6

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trads.). Harper & Row (original publicado en 1927).

Hui, Y. (2016). The Question concerning Technology in China: An Essay in Cosmotechnics. Urbanomic.

Husserl, E. (1999). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First book (F. Kersten, trad.). Kluwer Academic (original publicado en 1913).

Jonas, H. (1966). The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology. Harper & Row.

Jonas, H. (1984). The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. University of Chicago Press.

Kane, R. (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. (1997). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (M. Gregor, trad.). Cambridge University Press (original publicado en 1785).

Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, trads. & eds.). Cambridge University Press (original publicado en 1781).

Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.

Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64(4), 354-361. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x

Lonergan, B. J. F. (1957). Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Longmans, Green and Co.

Lopes, D. M. (2014). Beyond Art. Oxford University Press.

MacIntyre, A. (1981). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press.

MacIntyre, A. (1999). Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings need the Virtues. Open Court.

Marcel, G. (1949). The Mystery of Being: Volume I. Reflection and Mystery (G. S. Fraser, trad.). St. Augustine’s Press.

Marcel, G. (1951). The Mystery of Being: Volume II. Faith and Reality (R. Rosthal, trad.). St. Augustine’s Press.

Maritain, J. (1953). Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. Pantheon Books.

Maritain, J. (1994). The Person and the Common Good (J. J. Fitzgerald, trad.). University of Notre Dame Press (original publicado en 1947).

Maturana, H. R. & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. D. Reidel.

McGinn, C. (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. Basic Books.

Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435-450. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914

Nancy, J.-L. (2000). Being Singular Plural (R. D. Richardson & A. E. O’Byrne, trads.). Stanford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2006). Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Harvard University Press.

Oderberg, D. S. (2005). Real Essentialism. Routledge.

Oderberg, D. S. (2007). Teleology: Inorganic and Organic. In A. J. Beckwith (Ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on Natural Teleology (pp. 137–164). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Picard, R. W. (1997). Affective Computing. MIT Press.

Pius XI. (1931). Quadragesimo anno [Carta encíclica]. https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/la/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html

Polanyi, M. (1966). The Tacit Dimension. University of Chicago Press.

Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford University Press.

Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological Predicates. In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion (pp. 37-48). University of Pittsburgh Press.

Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, Language and Reality (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1965). De l’interprétation: Essai sur Freud. Éditions du Seuil.

Ricoeur, P. (1990). Oneself as Another (K. Blamey, trad.). University of Chicago Press.

Ross, J. F. (1992). Immaterial Aspects of Thought. The Journal of Philosophy, 89(3), 136-150. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026790

Russell, S. (2019). Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control. Viking.

Sandel, M. J. (2009). Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Scheler, M. (1928). Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. Francke.

Scheler, M. (1973). Formalism in Ethics and non-formal Ethics of Values (M. S. Frings & R. L. Funk, trads.). Northwestern University Press (original publicado en 1913–1916).

Scruton, R. (2009). Beauty: A very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.

Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417-457. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756

Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press.

Sen, A. & Nussbaum, M. C. (Eds.). (1993). The Quality of Life. Oxford University Press.

Simondon, G. (1958). Du mode d’existence des objets techniques. Éditions Aubier.

Spaemann, R. (1989). Persons: The Difference between Someone and Something (O. O’Donovan, trad.). Oxford University Press.

Spaemann, R. (1996). Glück und Wohlwollen: Versuch über Ethik. Klett-Cotta.

Stein, E. (1989). On the Problem of Empathy (W. Stein, trad.). ICS Publications (original publicado en 1917).

Taylor, C. (1985). Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I. Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Harvard University Press.

Taylor, C. (1994). The Politics of Recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (pp. 25-73). Princeton University Press.

Tolstói, L. (1995). What is Art? (R. Pevear & L. Volokhonsky, trads.). Penguin Books (original publicado en 1897).

Thomas Aquinas. (1947). Summa Theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trads.). Benziger Bros.

Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Manifesto. The Biological Bulletin, 215(3), 216-242. https://doi.org/10.2307/25470707

Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind, 59(236), 433-460. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433

Vallor, S. (2016). Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future worth Wanting. Oxford University Press.

Wallach, W. & Allen, C. (2009). Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong. Oxford University Press.

Publicado

30-06-2026

Cómo citar

Ramos-Zaga, F. A. (2026). Fondement hylémorphique de la discontinuité métaphysique entre l’intelligence artificielle et la subjectivité humaine. Studium. Filosofía Y Teología, 29(57), 43–71. https://doi.org/10.53439/stdfyt57.29.2026.43-71

Número

Sección

Artículos